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Sociological Amnesia: An Introduction
Alex Law and Eric Royal Lybeck
Trajectories: Success and Failure
In the late nineteenth century, a group of around twenty me bers of the American 
Economic Association (AEA) met in a private dining-room of a hotel for an 
informal talk about the subject of ‘sociology’. Albion Small, who was present at 
the AEA meeting, recalled a pent-up desire among those in attendance to determine 
once and for all a roadmap for the establishment of sociology as a traditional 
social science. During the meeting a theologian, president of a prominent New 
England seminary, declared that a starting place should be a radical reordering 
of the classification of the sciences. Many in the room, including Lester F. Ward, 
leaned forward in anticipation until the seminarian suggested, ‘in my judgment 
there never will be any reliable sociology until it has its place in a system of 
sciences founded on theology’ (Small 1924: 344). Ward, who was at the time the 
most well-known American sociologist, let out an exasperated gasp as he threw 
himself back in his chair in disgust and despair. Small noted that this was ‘last 
appearance of that particular Doctor of Divinity as a constructor of sociology’ 
(Small 1924: 344).
This would not be the last time that possible trajectories were excised from a 
discipline as it became increasingly conscious of itself as a discourse requiring 
a clear and stable basis for demarcation. During the so-called era of Classical 
sociology in the nineteenth and early twentieth century, intellectuals struggled 
within competitive discursive fields as academic disciplinary boundaries were 
established via the setting up of institutional positions and university departments, 
the framing of course syllabi, scientific conferences, introductory textbooks, and 
practical applications of sociology. During this period, in France, Émile Durkheim 
institutionalized sociology as a science of ‘social facts’, and, in Germany, Max 
Weber took up his chair in sociology at Munich (Lukes 1972; Mommsen and 
Osterhammel 1989).
Sociology was marked deeply by the uneven national contexts within 
which it struggled to establish itself. Its early development in France stamped 
the sociology envisioned by Auguste Comte with an overweening ambition to 
crown it ‘Queen of the Sciences’ based on a flimsy or non-existent empirical 
kingdom. As Claude Lévi-Strauss (1945: 503) put it in his mid-twentieth 
century review of French sociology: ‘French sociology was born early, and it 
still suffers from the gap which existed, at the time of its birth, between the 
© Copyrighted Material
© Copyrighted Material
ww
w.
as
hg
at
e.
co
m
  w
ww
.a
sh
ga
te
.co
m
  w
ww
.a
sh
ga
te
.co
m
  w
ww
.a
sh
ga
te
.co
m
  w
ww
.a
sh
ga
te
.co
m
  w
ww
.a
sh
ga
te
.co
m
  w
ww
.a
sh
ga
te
.co
m
  w
ww
.a
sh
ga
te
.co
m
Sociological Amnesia2
boldness of theoretical premonitions and the lack, or insufficiency, of concrete 
data’. A century beforehand, Karl Marx had argued that the closed philosophical 
systems formed by the eternal principles of nineteenth-century Germany were 
theoretical idealizations of the country’s socio-political under-development. 
Later, at a time of rapid social and economic development in Germany, Weber 
entered his critical dialogue with the ghost of Marx by developing a substantive 
form of sociology that famously allowed rationality considerable autonomy in 
the making of capitalism. In his lecture on ‘Science as a Vocation’, Weber (2013: 
341) expected that the sociology of his and each generation would be superseded 
by the discoveries and developments of future generations. It is the fate of all 
science that it faces imminent obsolescence. Supersession is the meaning of 
‘progress’ in science, Weber argued, the ‘inner attitude’ that sociologists are 
driven to adopt towards their own profession. All that can be done is to accept 
this daemonic fate and work towards it as the forced choice that needs to be 
made between the ‘warring gods’ of ultimate values. As only one alternative 
between warring cultural values, sociology is best pursued without edifying 
illusions about itself, Weber warned.
In America, dramatic material development amidst cultural and political 
spectacles appeared to give rise to sociology as the newest, most advanced 
science of modernity. The first department of sociology in the US, at Chicago, 
was established by 1892. Yet, like the discipline more widely, the cooperative 
efforts of determined individuals who constructed sociology contributed a rather 
eclectic and disparate undertaking, mixing European influences, notably the 
sociology of Georg Simmel, with emerging national concerns, such as urbanism. 
Around the same time, the weak and halting development of sociology in Britain 
was put down to the relative stability of social and political conditions since the 
eighteenth century unlike the rapid transition and crises experienced elsewhere 
in Europe and America (Rumney 1945). Gradual change without bouts of social 
upheaval and crises, it was argued, relieved British intellectuals from the need to 
study social processes, structures and relations too closely or systematically and 
to adopt piecemeal analyses and local surveys. At most, social stability and slow, 
incremental reform in Britain supported the dominant evolutionary schemas of 
Herbert Spencer and L.T. Hobhouse. However, such accounts omit the pioneering 
momentum of British sociology during the Edwardian period, before it subsided 
into passivity, allowing an alternative national sociological tradition to be forgotten 
or dismissed (Renwick 2012; Scott and Bromley 2014).
Once securely established, the history of sociology overwhelmingly focuses 
on ‘the winners’. During the 1930s, in America, Talcott Parsons aimed to resolve 
a perceived theoretical crisis by selectively consolidating the ‘classics’ (minus 
Marx) in The Structure of Social Action as a ‘canon’ of sociological thought (Camic 
1989; Parsons 1937). Parsons believed that a general theory could be woven from 
the conceptual fragmentation bequeathed by the founders of sociology in order to 
provide empirical study with more solid foundations. General theoretical systems 
of the kind constructed by Parsons and, more recently Habermas, tend to reproduce 
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Sociological Amnesia: An Introduction 3
the problem of fragmentation that they were devised to overcome (Holmwood 
1996). Any purely formal arrangement of premises and concepts like ‘structure’ 
and ‘action’ seems bound to succumb to repeated crises of fragmentation and 
theory reconstruction.
Sociologists from the past most routinely recognized today belong to the 
Trinitarian ‘canon’ of classical sociologists, Marx, Durkheim, and Weber, 
sometimes supported by other bit players like Comte or Simmel. More 
contemporary additions to the canon emerge typically out of a dialogue with ‘the 
classics’, either to synthesize, revise or challenge that legacy. This process of 
successively restricting sociology to the winners impoverishes sociology’s claim 
to be a form of historically reflexive knowledge. In this sense sociology can be 
considered a collective form of ‘amnesia’ insofar as the discipline’s self-knowledge 
avoids reconstruction of its own history and modes of thought, past and present. 
The overall field of the history of sociology results in an eternal dialogue with 
these most famous precursors, these heroes. In so doing, the uneven processes 
and struggles of sociology’s own making as a form of disciplinary knowledge is 
obscured and largely forgotten.
This book presses in the opposite direction. It focuses on sociologists who are 
largely forgotten today, as well as sociologists whose fortunes were revived after 
languishing in obscurity. By looking at now forgotten figures who were significant 
in their own time and previously obscure but now revived figures, new insights are 
opened up into not only individual sociologists themselves, but, more pointedly, 
our understanding of the discipline of sociology itself – its trajectories, forgotten 
promises and dead ends.
A Reflexive Sociology of Sociology
This distinctive approach is not intended as a compendium or history of sociology 
and sociologists. Its aim is to contribute towards the development of a historical 
sociology of sociology formed within and, at the same time, producing particular 
institutional and interpersonal fields. What did ‘sociology’ mean to those scholars 
present at the birth of the discipline? How has the discipline been shaped, organized, 
and institutionalized since? One cannot address these questions adequately guided 
solely by the light of our canonical ancestors. Rather, it becomes most important 
to understand who, when, where, and why sociologists became excluded from the 
canon, how they became ‘failures’. How does a figure as prominent as Lester Ward, 
the first president of the American Sociological Society (ASA), by all accounts the 
‘father of American sociology’, become forgotten within a decade? What were 
the political, economic, and ideological conditions that led to Raymond Aron’s 
prominence during the post-war era, and how have those conditions changed, such 
that he is almost erased from sociological discourse today?
We are therefore interested in ‘failures’, that is, sociologists whose projects 
did not ‘catch on’. These figures might have been minor academics throughout 
© Copyrighted Material
© Copyrighted Material
ww
w.
as
hg
at
e.
co
m
  w
ww
.a
sh
ga
te
.co
m
  w
ww
.a
sh
ga
te
.co
m
  w
ww
.a
sh
ga
te
.co
m
  w
ww
.a
sh
ga
te
.co
m
  w
ww
.a
sh
ga
te
.co
m
  w
ww
.a
sh
ga
te
.co
m
  w
ww
.a
sh
ga
te
.co
m
Sociological Amnesia4
their career, but many had considerable success within the discipline during their 
lifetimes, only to find themselves left behind. Others, like Norbert Elias, as Stephen 
Mennell shows in his chapter, were neglected for much of their career, headed 
toward obscurity, when suddenly his oeuvre and reputation was resurrected, not 
least through the collective efforts of strategically-situated individuals, as well as 
the physical and intellectual energies of the ageing Elias himself. How does such a 
comeback occur late in life? What were the conditions and chances that occurred to 
draw such attention to an obscure, often misunderstood figure disinclined toward 
self-promotion? Who were his allies? What was the role of publications, journals, 
and other resources mobilized on his behalf?
Indeed, in all cases, the institutional resources, materials, and practices of 
scholarly labour are essential objects of interest in establishing any sociology of 
sociologists. This approach, in line with the emerging ‘new sociology of ideas’ 
(Camic and Gross 2004; Camic, Gross, and Lamont 2011), focuses on the local 
interactions of academics ‘in the wild’ so to speak. Authors’ texts are placed 
within the context in which they were written. The current turn toward academic 
practice, however, has the potential to neglect broader, macro-sociological 
factors that condition the development of ideas. Theoretically, we therefore 
adopt a ‘processual’ or ‘relational’ approach informed by the social theories of 
Pierre Bourdieu, Norbert Elias, and Michel Foucault (Bourdieu 2004; Elias 1987; 
Foucault 2002). The concepts of ‘field’, ‘capital’, and ‘habitus’ are familiar to 
contemporary sociologists, and have been applied within the academic context 
in Bourdieu’s Homo Academicus (1988) and The State Nobility (1996). Elias’ 
process theory highlights the interaction between social habitus and individual 
habitus, while also alerting us to the ‘social fund of knowledge’ which pre-exists 
knowledge production (Elias 1987). Though not a figurational theorist, Foucault’s 
archaeological method provides one means of analysing discourses as structures 
composed of internal relations that develop across epistemological ‘thresholds’ 
(Foucault 2002).
Our approach is equal parts archaeological, figurational and reflexive in so 
far as it draws upon the sociologies of knowledge presented by Foucault, Elias 
and Bourdieu (Elias 1987; Foucault 2002, Bourdieu 2004). In the Archaeology 
of Knowledge, Foucault laid out his program for understanding what a discourse 
is, and what considerations must be taken into account should one attempt to 
grasp where, when, and how they emerge and evolve (Foucault 2002). The first 
task in this regard is a radical deconstruction of the signifier itself – in this case, 
‘sociology’. Foucault wrote, ‘These pre-existing forms of continuity, all these 
syntheses that are accepted without question, must remain in suspense’ (Foucault 
2002: 29). What was meant by the term ‘sociology’ in the nineteenth century 
was very different from our contemporary conception. It circulated within a 
context of interrelated institutions, economic and social processes, behavioral 
patterns, norms, and epistemic virtues that were substantially different from 
the relations and institutions of later phases. For Foucault (1989) an épistème 
can be identified retrospectively as the apparatus that establishes the conditions 
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Sociological Amnesia: An Introduction 5
of possibility for statements that are acceptable to and verified by a field of 
scientific expertise from all the possible statements and delimits what statements 
might be classified as ‘scientific’. Such épistèmes are, therefore, conditional on 
relations that are both internal and external to the discourse itself. Their norms, 
procedures and signifying content exist as constellations and as processes which 
bear some resemblances to other discursive forms, but are also highly particular 
and unique.
In order to sift through the ‘wheat of relevant information’, we should try 
to locate possible points of diffraction of the discourse, characterized by either 
incompatibility or equivalence between two objects, types of enunciation, or 
concepts (Foucault 2002: 58, 73). For example, the periods before and after 
the formations of the American and British sociological associations were such 
moments of possible diffraction. However, we must also study the economy of 
the discursive constellation; that is, the intellectual space available within the 
emergent positivity. We must consider the discourse of sociology in relation to 
the function (or lack thereof) that the discourse served for a field of non-discursive 
practices.
Thus, we have three formal levels of discursive analysis: points of diffraction, 
the economy of the field, and the external function; all of which are co-dependent 
yet irreducible to the others. Foucault proceeded to outline four potential 
emergences within a discursive formation’s evolution:
1. Threshold of positivity – the mo ent in which a discursive practice achieves 
individuality and autonomy; as a single system that enables the formation 
of statements to be put in operation.
2. Threshold of epistemologization – when a group of statements are articulated 
that claim to validate coherent norms over a realm of knowledge.
3. Threshold of scientificity – when the above epistemological figure 
obeys a number of formal criteria and certain laws for the construction 
of propositions.
4. Threshold of formalization – when this scientific discourse, in turn, defines 
axioms, legitimate propositional structures, and mechanisms for tolerating 
transformations (Foucault 2002: 205–6).
These thresholds are points of reference within multi-directional evolutions 
across all dimensions of the discourse. As historical emergences, they do not 
exist independently of, or fully replace, pre-existing forms of discourse. Rather, 
different thresholds represent identifiable moments in which rules, patterns 
of behavior, and inter-relationships, both internal and external, are made more 
concrete, predictable, and determining.
Along broadly similar lines, Norbert Elias’ figurational sociology suggested 
an analysis of the ‘sociogenesis’ and ‘psychogenesis’ of processes of structural 
formations (Elias 2000). Elias’ sociology opens the possibility for biographical 
consideration of particular figures while maintaining recognition of the 
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Sociological Amnesia6
structural, disciplinary field within which they were constituted. Like Foucault, 
Elias conceived of knowledge not as the unfolding accumulation of inherently 
accurate or true knowledge as perceived by a transcendental subject. Rather, Elias 
considered individual contributions to knowledge as always premised upon the 
historical accumulation and context of knowledge that exist at particular points of 
time. Despite its many ruptures and ‘breaks’ knowledge is always constituted in 
media res.
Sociological theories of knowledge have to break with the firmly entrenched 
tradition according to which every person in terms of her or his own knowledge 
is a beginning. No person ever is. Every person, from the word go, enters a pre-
existing knowledge stream. He or she may later improve and augment it. But it 
is always an already existing social fund of knowledge which is advanced in this 
manner, or perhaps made to decline (Elias 1987: xvii).
The development of knowledge is a process, not a static system that is settled at 
any moment. The modern detached scientific perspective on nature, emerged from 
prototypical versions of this way of thinking as it became increasingly defined by 
rules and habitualized practices (Elias 1987: xx). As such, one can always extend 
one’s analysis farther and farther back in time ad infinitum. Particular ways of 
knowing are preceded by other ways of not-knowing, and may later regress back 
into relative ignorance, providing the conditions for a novel emergence within the 
creative process of discovery. Which direction these movements take cannot be 
imputed a priori, but must be understood within the theoretical frame of figurations 
formed by dynamic processes.
At the same time, the construction of disciplines takes place within a field of 
competitive intellectual actors (Bourdieu 1988; Collins 1998). Thus, sociologists 
at the turn of the twentieth century engaged in what Thomas Gieryn called 
‘boundary-work’: the concerted effort to distinguish real science from amateur and 
non-scientific versions of sociology (Gieryn 1983). The task that lies before us, 
then, is to position the figures of interest in the broadest context of what might be 
called their sociopolitical ‘worldview’, as well as within a specific spatio-temporal 
field of forces struggling for individual and disciplinary recognition within and 
outside of the university.
Since the sociologist is necessarily situated in the world that they seek to analyse, 
a degree of reflexivity must be brought to bear on sociology’s implicit assumptions 
and misrecognitions of itself and the problems of complicity with the spontaneous 
immediacy of everyday forms of knowledge. As Bourdieu argued, the ‘sociology 
of sociology is a fundamental dimension of sociological epistemology’ (Bourdieu 
and Wacquant 1992: 68). It is not merely a question therefore of focussing on 
the biographical trajectory of individual sociologists. This would excessively 
individualize what Elias (1991) usefully called the ‘social habitus’. Within the 
complex chains of interdependency that ensnare individual sociologists, one – the 
sociological – acquires a special significance. Such a ‘sociological habitus’ always 
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Sociological Amnesia: An Introduction 7
emerges as a break with the general social habitus formed by everyday routines 
and the implicit assumptions of national societies.
The ‘sociological habitus’ begins to re-model the seemingly unmediated, 
spontaneous nature and implicit national habitus of everyday life. Acquiring a 
sociological habitus opens up a process of specialization and separation from the 
practical immediacy of everyday life. As the discipline comes to appear too remote 
from urgent problems, calls are made for a re-engaged ‘public sociology’. Yet the 
sociological habitus is far from a serene calling unto itself. It involves choices 
and struggles between alternative, competing perspectives, research problems, 
methodologies, and professional and political networks. It demands a display of 
scholarly competence appropriate to the field and sub-field, demonstrating an ease 
and familiarity with its approved knowledge set and modes of self-presentation. 
Professional habit and self-images, as well as the profits of ritualistic transgression, 
only became possible once sociology has acquired institutional recognition as a 
basic university subject.
Without the collective effort of reflexive self-understanding, sociologists 
run the risk of projecting their individual habitus onto the object of study in 
which ‘scientific discourse’ is mobilized to express unconscious sentiments like 
resentment, ambition, disdain, a whole range of unanalysed experiences and 
feelings about the social world (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992). The theoretical 
approach adopted here, therefore, focuses historical attention on disciplinary fields 
and formations, including:
a) the overall trajectory of discipline(s),
b) the internal elements and relations between theories and statements, and
c) canonization projects during or after a scholar’s career.
This represents the first or ‘sociological’ dimension of the study, establishing the 
‘context’ in its wider sense. The second level of analysis examines the individual 
biography of one or more agents within this context. Here we are interested in the 
entry of individuals into the disciplinary field at a certain stage in its institutional 
development. Specific dates and geographical locations are established in relation 
to the epistemological structure of the discipline at that time and place. We must 
further evaluate the relationship of individual ‘habitus’ to the content of theories 
and the trajectory of the disciplinary field, past, present, and future. Finally, 
institutional support, including material resources, student acolytes, and peer 
recognition, re significant factors for plotting the direction of the sociologist’s 
trajectory.
How to be Forgotten
In this volume, we have sought a wide range of contributions to address the 
question of why certain sociologists and schools of thought become forgotten. The 
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Sociological Amnesia8
issue of who can be deemed ‘forgotten’ or ‘failed’ is a complicated definitional 
issue, and, indeed, we do not imply the sociologists as individuals have ‘failed’ 
in a purely epistemological sense. Rather the discipline of sociology has itself 
failed in two senses: first, by restricting its historical self-conception to canonical 
figures it neglects the actual history of its discursive developments. The second 
failure follows from the first insofar as sociology’s claim to be a form of reflexive 
knowledge is limited by the arrest or misrecognition of sociological thought past 
and present. This book represents a move towards recovering this forgotten legacy 
and attempts to begin the process of reflexive reconstruction.
As Elias would chide us, the sociology of sociology does not begin from a 
zero-point in the present. It builds on previous work in the field of the ‘sociology 
of sociology’. From its earliest origins, sociology has concerned itself with the 
emergence of sociological thought. August Comte’s three stage model moving 
from the Theological to Metaphysical to Positivist phases of human history and 
thought sought to connect changes in the infrastructure of social order to changes 
in the orientation of social thought (Comte 1975). Regardless of the merits of 
the Positivist legacy, subsequent generations of sociologists have concerned 
themselves with the organization of their own disciplinary knowledge, seeking to 
root the development of social understanding (or, perhaps, lack thereof) in relation 
to changes in the structure of the social environment.
Karl Mannheim, for example, isolated the shift from epistemological to 
psychological to sociological interpretations of knowledge during the rapid 
transformation of social mobility since the Enlightenment (Mannheim 1985). 
His colleague in Frankfurt, Herbert Marcuse, similarly sought explanation for the 
shift from Hegelian ‘Reason’ to Marxist ‘Revolution’ in the changing structure of 
industrial capitalist society (Marcuse 1941). Subsequent analyses, drawn from the 
New Left critique of monopoly capitalism and the neglected standpoints of the 
working class, women and ethnic minorities, critically reassessed the hegemonic 
discourse of structural functionalism and quantitative social research (Gouldner 
1970; Schwendinger and Schwendinger 1974; Therborn 1976). While much of 
this sociology of sociology provided insights into the relationship between social 
scientific ideology and the broader class structure of late capitalism, rarely did 
these works penetrate to the level of academic practice.
Under the influence of Thomas Kuhn, a number of scholars and historians 
began consideration of sociology as a shared ‘paradigm’ established by a scholarly 
community (Haskell 2000; Kuhn 1962; Ross 1992). Among the most promising 
of these agendas was the ‘schools’ approach recommended by Edward Tiryakian 
(1979). Since sociology rarely accumulates ‘knowledge’ in the manner of scientific 
communities described by Kuhn, the sociology of sociology should dedicate 
attention to study of various ‘schools’ of sociology. Charismatic founders of schools 
like s ructural-functionalism promoted methodological approaches that were 
subsequently ‘depersonalized’ and diffused by students. The institutional dynamics 
which extend the reputation of the school also foreshadows its inevitable downfall as 
success leads to attempts by rivals to overthrow the newly dominant paradigm. One 
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Sociological Amnesia: An Introduction 9
need think only of the unchallenged dominance of Parsonian structural functionalism 
and its rapid wholesale overhaul during the last third of the twentieth century.
Similar studies focus on the institutional dynamics, particularly the patronage 
networks and resource bases of sociological research, as in Turner and Turner 
(1990). In covering the history of American sociology in relation to the base of 
economic support, the authors note shifts during the pre-World War I, interwar and 
post-war periods, which corresponded with changes in the institutional support for 
academic sociological research. More recently, the so-called ‘new sociology of 
ideas’ has rooted such developments in relation to interdisciplinary struggles for 
position. Charles Camic, for example, explains the success of Parsons’ Structure 
of Social Action, with reference to the disciplinary battles between sociology, 
economics and biology raging at Harvard at the time of Parsons’ writing (Camic 
1989). This struggle to exercise command over interdisciplinary turf explains the 
success of Parsons’ charter for a yet to be institutionally established discipline.
Other research, such as that of Andrew Abbott (1999, 2001), shares with the 
new sociologists of ideas and the institutionalists, an interest in the disciplinary 
and resource struggles amongst academics, and retains the insight of the Tiryakian 
‘schools’ approach that sociology does not tend to accumulate knowledge in the 
traditional scientific sense. Rather, sociologis s recycle broadly similar concerns 
while constantly revolutionizing the categorical terms used to describe them, 
such as the cyclical repetition of the supposed opposition between ‘realism’ and 
‘constructionism’ . These patterns of cultural recycling tend to occur in generational 
waves as young scholars engage in an Oedipal struggle against the gerontocracy of 
elders who monopolize the reward structures of the academic profession. Abbott 
admitted that this patterned generational change, or ‘slip-clutch’, does embody 
a form of dynamism, ‘even if that change is organized in a regular succession 
whereby the young build their careers on forgetting and rediscovery, while the 
middle-aged are doomed to see the common sense of their graduate school years 
refurbished and republished as brilliant new insight’ (Abbott 2001: 148).
Various approaches have the potential to address the concerns of the present 
book. Most commentaries are dedicated to canonical or ‘successful’ sociologists 
who receive funding, establish a paradigm and contribute to the hegemonic 
stabilization of sociological knowledge in a given period. But, what about those 
scholars who do not extend into the history books and drop out of the conservation 
of sociological n tworks? Are the dynamics which lead to the success of a paradigm 
the same as that which leads to ‘failure’? Such is the question addressed by Neil 
McLaughlin in ‘How to become a Forgotten Intellectual’, a study of Erich Fromm, 
in contrast to the new sociologist of ideas, Michele Lamont’s analysis of Derrida’s 
success (Lamont 1987; McLaughlin 1998). McLaughlin demonstrates that the 
rise and fall of Fromm’s reputation had much to do with the success of his ideas 
in the broader public sphere. The popularity of his research in public discourse, 
and the broadness of his humanistic concerns, in fact, contributed to the decline 
of his reputation within specialized academic disciplines. This example points to 
a dynamic of considerable interest for the present volume, namely the limiting 
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Sociological Amnesia10
role of academic disciplinarity as contributing to the ‘failure’ of given sociologists 
and sociological traditions. As we will see time and again, those scholars wh se 
work transcends the boundaries of sociology as institutionally defined tend to be 
isolated from the canonical lineage.
It is not only sociology that engages in intellectual fratricide. Randall Collins 
(1998) traces how intellectual networks in the oldest discipline, philosophy, 
have been beset by disagreement and rivalry in ways that structure the creative 
possibilities of the field. Such a social constructivist theory of intellectual field 
does not fatally undermine epistemological judgements about the reality of the 
object of study. Truth cannot be ‘true’ in itself, the pre-social outpouring of a 
disembodied mind. All the criteria mobilized for establishing the truth of statements 
about reality emerge as a process over generations through social networks. Truth, 
including the truth of the network itself, is communicated through verbal symbols 
formed by shared rituals of interaction. As Collins (1998: 860) argues, echoing 
Elias, ‘we are always in media res, in the middle of things’. Individuals only form 
ideas as part of the conversation and problems of wider social networks. This is 
why sociological reflexivity often appears as such an affront to the established 
truths of science and philosophy.
Sociological Amnesia
We have sought original contributions from a range of scholars interested in 
developing a reflexive historical sociology of sociology. We have asked the authors 
to study their ‘cases’ in relation to the concern with disciplinary ‘amnesia’. This 
includes the trajectory of scholars who were once famous, but later fell into relative 
obscurity. Peter Baehr’s study of Raymond Aron’s reputation in British sociology 
is the first of subsequent chapters. Baehr highlights the considerable reputation that 
Aron enjoyed within postwar British sociology, as well as his popularity among 
intellectual journals and public opinion more broadly. However Baehr’s research 
into the syllabi of British undergraduate sociology reveals his near absence from 
teaching. This reflects the importance of synthetic texts consolidating a thinker’s 
point of view, as well as the role of teaching as a necessary condition for retention 
of a sociologist’s oeuvre.
The next chapter, by Bortolini and Cossu, focuses, not on the neglect of 
scholars themselves, but rather on two similar books written by Clifford Geertz 
and Robert Bellah. The study charts the course and migration of the books due to 
the nature of the disciplines in relation to the authors’ performative contribution. 
Bortolini and Cossu’s conceptual innovation of considering the works and the 
authors themselves as cultural objects effectively demonstrates the interaction 
between what might be called the ‘variation and selection process’ bearing on the 
disciplinary field. The chapter also gives insight in the context of other disciplines 
at the time – e.g., religious studies, anthropology and history – and why certain 
opportunities for cross fertilization were available for Geertz and not Bellah.
© Copyrighted Material
© Copyrighted Material
ww
w.
as
hg
at
e.
co
m
  w
ww
.a
sh
ga
te
.co
m
  w
ww
.a
sh
ga
te
.co
m
  w
ww
.a
sh
ga
te
.co
m
  w
ww
.a
sh
ga
te
.co
m
  w
ww
.a
sh
ga
te
.co
m
  w
ww
.a
sh
ga
te
.co
m
  w
ww
.a
sh
ga
te
.co
m
Sociological Amnesia: An Introduction 11
The role of disciplinary interfaces is also important in Kieran Durkin’s chapter 
on Erich Fromm. Following a biographical review that builds to the period 
analysed by McLaughlin, Durkin returns to consider what else is lost when a 
sociologist drops off the map: namely the content of the research. Summaries 
of two cases of empirical research put to rest assumptions that Fromm was an 
armchair psychoanalyst, while demonstrating the promise of recovering Fromm’s 
insights into character and social psychology.
Similar issues relating to the role of content and ideas emerge in the chapters 
by E. Stina Lyon on Viola Klein and Liz Stanley on Olive Schreiner. Stina Lyon 
assesses the merits of Klein’s forgotten dissertation on the French novelist, Celine. 
There are many instances of ‘amnesia’ within the chapter, including Klein’s own 
neglect of this work in her later achievements. It is interesting to see the way in 
which Klein’s analysis connect to changes in Celine’s career as they occurred 
in real time. This draws attention to the potential pitfalls of direct application of 
the sociology of knowledge to single authors. In Stina Lyon’s retrieval of Klein’s 
dissertation, the reader encounters the way Klein’s analysis of Celine’s ‘detached’ 
literary style contributed to her later work on patriarchy in language. Her concluding 
assessment of Klein’s rejection of Mannheim’s advice demonstrates that it was 
the literary and linguistic side of her analytic style that was retained, while the 
sociology of knowledge was sidelined. One can see from earlier reflection on her 
dissertation that Klein had already experienced the ‘failure’ of the Mannheimian 
approach.
In her study of Schreiner, Stanley opens up a productive contrast between 
networks and figurations that contribute to exploration of long-term relationships 
as significant factors within social outcomes. Here, figurational analysis is used to 
show how Schreiner’s work and f te was shaped by the confluence of international 
connections, at once political, sociological and cultural, at the interstices of ‘race’, 
nation, class and gender in the context of imperialism and militarism. The analysis 
effectively demonstrates the way in which political-ethical concerns seemed to 
drive intellectual interaction as much as the content of the ideas. Similarly, these 
interests contribute to different patterns of integration with academic disciplines, 
and eventually to patterns of ‘forgetting’ within these disciplines.
In her chapter, Bridget Fowler provides a powerful restatement of Lucien 
Goldmann’s relevance (and some limitations) for present-day sociology. The 
structure of the chapter allows a careful unpicking of the ‘tragic vision’ and social 
structure leading to more programmatic statements for a sociology of literature and 
class. These observations strengthen the comparison with Bourdieu that Fowler 
develops across the chapter. As she reminds us, Bourdieu adopted Goldmann’s 
concept of ‘genetic structuralism’ as part of a response to the now largely forgotten 
‘structuralist controversy’ that engulfed the human sciences in France in the 
1960s as a way to by-pass the false opposition posed between existentialism and 
structuralism.
In their chapter, Dawson and Masquelier’s distillation of G.D.H. Cole’s 
associational sociology reminds us that one need not be called a ‘sociologist’ to 
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Sociological Amnesia12
be a sociologist. While recognizing the work going on in the supposedly empty 
period in British sociology prior to 1950, the authors’ comparison with Durkheim 
and a kind of Rousseauean sociology is especially striking. Through this lens, we 
observe the way that Cole’s political and normative commitment to guild socialism 
was shaped by his now neglected social theory.
More recently, the rise of actor-network-theory has revived interest in the work 
of Gabriel Tarde. Álvaro Santana-Acuña’s study considers Tarde’s onadology 
in light of the uncanonized field. The resulting chapter becomes a study of one 
‘path not taken’, for sociology as a whole. Santana-Acuña’s summarization of 
monadology, including the prehistory and Tarde’s innovation of making monads 
‘social’ introduces the reader to the significance of his work, while attending to 
potential reasons why Tarde’s sociology has begun making a comeback in the 
contemporary context of poststucturalism, the rehabilitation of agency and the 
crisis of the ‘social’.
Not all of our contributors adopt an explicitly figurational or relational 
approach to the dynamics of the sociological field. Indeed, not all of the figures 
discussed can be considered ‘sociologists’ in a strict sense. As the chapters 
by Davidson and Memos illustrate, some like Castoriadis and MacIntyre 
would have categorized themselves as philosophers and it is only with elastic 
semantic tension that the label of sociolo y can be appended to their work. 
Philosophers have generally been content to establish the epistemological, 
ethical and political preconditions for sociology as an empirical science. Even 
here, however, philosophers grappling with social and political problems 
cannot help but stray into territory that sociology would like to reserve for 
itself. A politically-committed philosopher like Louis Althusser, for instance, 
was inspired by certain ‘striking turns of phrase’ to read very closely a 
limited number of texts and from this to elaborate contrasts, oppositions and 
connections as the basic procedure for constructing theory: ‘I constructed a 
whole philosophical system as if it had no object (in the sense that science 
has an object), but was rather a practical and polemical affair, and I began to 
develop a practical and polemical view of philosophy, based on a model of 
political thought I was working out at the same time’ (Althusser 1993: 169). 
Polemical intent, of course, did not prevent philosophers from pronouncing on 
matters of sociological enquiry. Radical political philosophy was defined for 
much of the twentieth century by the crisis of Marxism and the class nature of 
Soviet society. Too often, as Memos reminds us, solutions were proclaimed 
polemically by stale political categories like ‘totalitarianism’, dictatorship or 
socialist state in the absence of a comparative historical sociology of social 
structure, relations and dynamics.
As important as the analysis of ‘failed’ or ‘forgotten’ sociologists or 
sociological texts are, we are equally interested in the rare occasions in which a 
sociologist moves from obscurity to renown. The most dramatic instance of this 
shift is the case of Norbert Elias. In his chapter Stephen Mennell situates Elias 
in the intellectual and political context of his time in post-war Britain. Then, the 
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Sociological Amnesia: An Introduction 13
intellectual field was shaped by a number of forces, including the anti-Marxism 
of the Cold War years, advanced not least by the ideological pronouncements of 
the philosopher of science Karl Popper; a stifling intellectual culture induced by 
empiricism, social administration, and hegemonic American sociology; and the 
post-imperial reaction of anthropologists (who exercised a neglected element of 
hegemony over sociologists). Against the self-evidence of national figurations, 
Elias (2014: 53–134) posed the problem of what Rodney Needham (1972) called 
‘the question of the logical unity of mankind’, something that both Elias and 
Needham argue cannot be resolved by a priori epistemological fiat but must be 
determined by empirical study.
As Mennell reminds us, sociological amnesia is aided and abetted by the 
disciplinary schism between empiricism and theoreticism. A form of sociology 
concerned with supposedly pre-theoretical forms of data is subject to the effects 
of heterogeneous influences over the construction of sociological problems. These 
come to be defined by the immediate concerns of research agencies, governmental 
policy or media agendas. Constrained by the short-term horizons of the present, 
empiricist amnesia surrenders the disciplinary autonomy required as a means 
of orientation for understanding the longer-term trajectory of human society, its 
possibilities and probabilities. Social theory, meanwhile, wriggles free from its 
necessary moorings in sustained empirical inquiry. At best, a few examples culled 
from newspapers often suffices to illustrate intricately constructed conceptual 
edifices about the latest new beginning in social theory. By calling for a more 
reflexive approach to sociology’s ‘failures’, this volume begins to offer a corrective 
to the double trap set for sociology by epistemological and methodological 
reification.
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